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INTRODUCTION

In a previous article,' I wrote about a "legal archaeology" project,
in which I researched the historical and economical background of
one of the canonical first year contract cases, Alaska Packers' Ass'n v.
Domenico.2 In this piece, I am going to undertake an examination of
Professor Snyder's central theory, that using contract law to resolve
labor disputes distorts contract law in unfortunate ways,3 and see how
it plays out against Alaska Packers'. As Professor Snyder notes, my
research into Alaska Packers' suggests that the classical contract doctrine was not well suited to dealing with the emerging problems of
labor relations at the turn of the last century.4 I conclude, however,
that examining the case to see if the labor context in turn distorted the
development of contract doctrine reveals some complications to Professor Snyder's theory.
In Part II, I will give a brief recapitulation of the facts and background of Alaska Packers' as revealed by my digging into the case. In
Part III, I will briefly discuss the doctrinal evolution of duress and the
pre-existing duty rule before and after Alaska Packers' and conclude
that this evolution complicates, but does not negate, Professor
Snyder's insight into the "pernicious effect" 5 of labor disputes on the
development of contract doctrine. Finally, in Part IV, I will point out
the continuing relevance of the case to the intersection of labor and
t Associate Dean and Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah.
1. Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers' Association v. Domenico,
2000 UTAH L. REV. 185.
2. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
3. See Franklin G. Snyder, The PerniciousEffect of Employment Relationshipson
the Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33, 35 (2003).
4. Id.

5. Id., at 34.
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contracts, and suggest that a hundred years of experience dealing with
labor disputes has not clarified the lesson of Alaska Packers'.
II.

A

FULLER FACTUAL NARRATIVE FOR ALASKA PACKERS':
WHAT LEGAL ARCHAEOLOGY REVEALS

Alaska Packers' involved a lawsuit brought by a group of Alaskan
salmon fishermen to recover wages they claimed were due and owing.6 The fishermen had been hired in San Francisco in the early
spring of 1900.' According to the allegations in their complaint, when
they arrived at the cannery in Pyramid Harbor, Alaska, they discovered that the nets provided by the canning company were substandard.8 They then refused to continue working until the company
either provided new nets or raised their wages. 9 Due to the distance
from the mainland and the short duration of the salmon fishing season, obtaining replacements for the nets, or for that matter the fishermen, was not feasible, and the general manager of the cannery agreed
to raise their wages.1 ° A new written contract was drawn up and executed.1 1 When the fishermen returned to San Francisco in the fall,
however, the canning company12refused to pay anything more than the
originally agreed upon wages.
The central factual dispute at trial was whether the nets provided by
the company were adequate.1 3 If the nets were inadequate, then the
fishermen would have been justified in their work stoppage due to the
failure of an implied condition in their employment contract, that is,
that the company would provide serviceable equipment to the fishermen. If the nets were adequate, then the fishermen could not justify
their work stoppage on that ground.
Most of the fishermen were Italian immigrants.1 4 At trial, three of
the fishermen testified through an interpreter that the nets were old
and rotten, that they could be ripped apart with two fingers, and that
they would not hold the salmon.15 Conversely, the general manager
of the cannery testified that only the bottom half of the nets were in
this condition, that the top half was new and strong, and that in the
location where they fished, the salmon were found only toward the
surface of the water. 6 Due to the fact that most of the fishermen did
6.
117 F.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Domenico v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 112 F. 554, 555 (N.D. Cal. 1901), rev'd,
99 (9th Cir. 1902).
Id.
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 555-56.
Id. at 556.
Id.
Threedy, supra note 1, at 204.
Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 207.
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not speak English 17 and that they were fishing at Pyramid Harbor for
the first time,' 8 the possibility exists that the fishermen may not have
understood the unique nature of the nets used by Pyramid Harbor.
The trial judge held that the nets were indeed serviceable.19 According to the trial judge's written opinion, this conclusion was based
upon his assumption that, of course, the company would have wanted
the fishermen to catch as many fish as possible.2 ° This assumption,
however, may have been erroneous.
There are at least four reasons why the company may not have
cared whether the fishermen were catching as many fish as possible.
First, it was common at that time for Alaskan canneries to catch more
fish than they could process before the fish spoiled.2 ' Canning was
not yet mechanized and was a very labor intensive process. Moreover,
there was no way of refrigerating the caught fish. Whether this problem of catching too many fish too quickly applied to the cannery at
Pyramid Harbor is unknown but it is a possibility.
Second, whether or not the cannery was able to can the fish before
they spoiled, Pyramid Harbor was prepared to can only a specific
amount of salmon." It had limited supplies on hand for canning, all
of which had to be brought up from California before the salmon season began. Thus, it was possible that the cannery would not have sufficient supplies on hand to can all of the salmon caught by the
fishermen.
Third, Pyramid Harbor spent more to can a case of salmon than
other canneries.2 3 It also spent a disproportionate amount on fishing
gear, compared to other canneries.24 The lack of wide, flat beaches in
the vicinity of Pyramid Harbor prevented the cannery from using the
more efficient seine nets and required it to use the less efficient and
more expensive gill nets. The manager of the cannery may well have
been concerned about the cost per case of salmon and may have tried
to economize by reusing a portion of last year's nets.
Finally, the cannery did have another source of fish. Despite the
assumption by the court, it was not relying exclusively on its employ17. Id. at 205.
18. Id. at 206.
19. See Domenico v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 112 F. 554, 556 (N.D. Cal. 1901),
rev'd, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
20. Id. ("The [cannery's] interest required that [the fishermen] should be provided
with every facility necessary to their success as fishermen, for on such success depended the [cannery's] profits.... In view of this self-evident fact, it is highly improbable that the [cannery] gave [the fishermen] rotten and unserviceable nets .....
21. Threedy, supra note 1, at 209.
22. Id. at 211.
23. Id. at 202, 211.
24. Id.
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ees' catch for its seasonal production. Each year, the cannery bought
25
a significant number of fish from the local Native American tribes.
Moreover, the trial judge did not explicitly address whether it was
possible that the fishermen in good faith, albeit mistakenly, believed
the nets were inadequate. The uniqueness of the nets and the language barriers between the immigrant fishermen and the general manager may well have created such a misunderstanding.
Despite having lost on the central factual dispute, the trial judge
ruled in favor of the fishermen. 26 He did this by invoking the contract
doctrine of novation.2 7 That doctrine provides that parties to a contract are free to terminate their existing contract and enter into a new
one.
We can only speculate upon the trial judge's reasons for his decision. He may have been a firm believer in the concept of freedom of
contract and felt that his obligation was to enforce the parties' intent,
as he understood it,28 despite his rejection of the fishermen's asserted
reason for striking. He may have interpreted the executing of a new
contract, with the formality of reducing it to writing and having it witnessed by a government official 29 as an objective manifestation of the
parties' intent to terminate the old contract and enter into a new one.
Alternatively, he may have believed that the fishermen's work stoppage was based upon a good faith belief that the nets were inadequate, whatever their actual condition, and thus been willing to
enforce the modification. 3' It is even possible that he may have been
25. Id. at 212.
26. Domenico v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 112 F. 554, 560 (N.D. Cal. 1901), rev'd,
117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
27. Id. at 557.
28. Of course, reliance on "the parties' intent" is endlessly problematic. First of
all, it presumes that the parties shared a unitary intent, which may not be the case.
The fishermen may have intended to terminate the old contract and enter into a new
one while the company, through the general manager, may have only intended to
modify the contract. There is also the possibility that one or both of the parties did
not have a specific intent with regard to this legal issue; that is, they may not have
appreciated the fine distinction between a novation and a modification, and so may
not have intended either. Their intent may have been the general one of entering into
a binding agreement. Finally, there is the problem of how a judge or any other third
party is to determine what actually is going on in the head, assuming that is where

intent is formed, of another person.
29. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1902).
30. This is the current UCC standard. Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-209(1)
(2003) states:
Subsection (1) provides that an agreement modifying a sales contract needs
no consideration to be binding.
However, modifications made thereunder must meet the test of good faith
imposed by this Act. The effective use of bad faith to escape performance
on the original contract terms is barred, and the extortion of a "modification" without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the
duty of good faith.
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sympathetic to workers as a class and willing to use any doctrine that
would allow them to prevail. 3'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment in favor of the
fishermen.3 2 The court held that it was error to apply the doctrine of
novation and that the correct rule to apply was the pre-existing duty
rule.3 3 That rule provided that, where there is a pre-existing duty to
perform an act, that act could not serve as consideration for a promise. Thus, the fishermen having been under a pre-existing contractual
duty to work for the company for the originally agreed upon wages,
there is no consideration "available" to support the company's promise of additional wages.
Although the court justifies its rejection of the novation rule by invoking a "weight of authority" argument,34 the court's language
reveals that, from a policy perspective, the court was concerned about
the possibility of bad faith and coercive behavior on the part of the
fishermen.
Alaska Packers',viewed from a labor law perspective, is fairly typical of its time. From labor's perspective, the case did little to recognize workers' grievances or support the self-help remedy of a work
stoppage. From capital's perspective, the case served to encourage investment in new industries, by preventing labor from using any monopoly power to leverage a larger share of the pie from the owners.
While not surprising that the courts analyzed the case from a contracts
perspective (there was as yet no language of labor law in which to
analyze the case), certainly contract law provided no ready-made tools
ideally fashioned for regulating on-going labor relations. Indeed, as
relational contracts theorists are fond of pointing out, the classical
contract doctrine does a poor job of regulating any kind of long-term,
on-going contract, labor or otherwise.3 6 Thus, as Professor Snyder argues, Alaska Packers' can be thought of as "a kind of poster child for
the problems" you get
when you analyze employment issues under a
37
contracts framework.
In the next section, I examine the case's impact on contract doctrine
and, in particular, investigate whether the labor context of the case
served in any way to distort the development of contract doctrine.

31. There is some indication in his background that he might be sympathetic to
labor, but there is nothing specific in the record to support this hypothesis.
32. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 105 (9th Cir. 1902).
33. See id. at 102-05.
34. Id. at 105.
35. Threedy, supra note 1, at 195-96.
36. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 483, 496-508.
37. Snyder, supra note 3, at 35.
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SOME COMPLICATIONS TO PROFESSOR SNYDER'S
"PERNICIOUS EFFECT" THEORY

In his paper, Professor Snyder proposes a provocative theory: that
the use of contract doctrine to resolve labor disputes tends to distort
the development of contract law.38 He analogizes using contract law
to resolve labor issues to using a square peg to fill a round hole: the
square peg of contract law does not do a very good job of filling the
labor problem hole, and forcing the contract peg into the labor hole
tends to bend and deform the peg.39
In applying Professor Snyder's insight to Alaska Packers', I encounter complications that in no way negate his theory but do suggest the
process may be more complex than it initially appears. The "uncomplicated" version of the theory would suggest that, due to the labor
context of the case, contract law underwent a change, a deformation,
that had unintended and deleterious consequences for contract law.
At first glance, this theory seems accurate.
The Ninth Circuit decided the case in favor of the cannery owners
on the basis of the pre-existing duty rule. n ° That rule states that a
modification of a contract, in which one party agrees to do only what
the original contract required while the other party agrees to a performance that is somehow different, lacks consideration. Because the
first party is only doing what it was under a pre-existing contractual
duty to do, there is no available consideration coming from the first
party to support the new duty assumed by the second party.
There is no question whatsoever but that, in the opinion of many,
this is an unfortunate rule." Among other critics, Judge Posner, who
approaches legal problems from a law and economics perspective, has
provided a trenchant critique of the rule-which as we will see is particularly interesting because he is currently the number one fan of the
Alaska Packers' case. He argues that using the pre-existing duty rule
to police contract modifications is both over-inclusive and underinclusive:
[T]he former because most modifications are not coercive and
should be enforceable whether or not there is fresh consideration,
the latter because, since common law courts inquire only into the
existence and not the adequacy of consideration, a requirement of
fresh consideration has little bite. B might give A a peppercorn, a
38. Id.
39. Id. at 36.
40. See Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102-05 (9th Cir. 1902).
41. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the UCC:
Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IowA L. REV. 849, 852 (1979)
("Because the pre-existing duty rule is a roadblock to the free adjustment of contracts, the rule lost favor with courts and commentators.").

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol10/iss1/6
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V10.I1.4

6

Labor Disputes
in Contract Law:
Past and Present
of Alaska Pa
2003] Threedy:
THE PAST
AND PRESENT
OFThe
ALASKA
PACKERS'
71

kitten, or a robe in exchange for A's agreeing to reduce the contract
price, and then the modification would be enforceable ....
Posner, as well as the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code,
tend to agree that the concept of economic duress does a far better job
of policing opportunistic forced modifications by the party with the
superior bargaining power.43
Accordingly, it could be argued that, because Alaska Packers' is a
labor case, it is the labor relations context that results in this unfortunate rule, and that it took contract doctrine another fifty years to recognize its error and "correct" the rule.
There are two complications with this narrative, however. First,
Alaska Packers' was not the first manifestation of the pre-existing duty
rule. Earlier cases had involved a construction contract 44 and repayment of a debt.45 In the construction case, one party agreed to build
something for a set price and then part way through the construction
process demanded an additional amount.4 6 The landowner agreed,
but after the project was completed, refused to pay the additional
amount.4 7 In the debt case, the debtor offered to pay the creditor less
than the original debt, to which the creditor initially agreed, but then
later sued for the original debt.4 8 Thus, it is not fair to say that the
labor context of Alaska Packers' is what caused the unfortunate turn
of events in contract law; that had happened before the case arose.
Second, although the Ninth Circuit's rhetoric strongly suggests the
court was thinking duress, 4 9 at the time of the case, that doctrine was
not obviously suited to the facts of Alaska Packers'. At common law,
the original concept of "duress" as a ground for invalidating a contract
was limited to situations where the party was actually imprisoned or
threatened with death or severe bodily harm." At equity, however,
there existed the doctrine of "undue influence," which was not limited
to situations where a party feared the wrongful actions of another, but
was broad enough to encompass such situations.51 Over time, the two
doctrines tended to merge; although at the time of the Alaska Packers'
opinions, this broader concept of duress was not completely
accepted.52
42. Wis. Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986).
43. Id. at 1285-86.
44. Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co., 15 S.W. 844, 846-47 (Mo. 1891).
45. Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605, 611-12 (H.L. 1884) (appeal taken from Eng.
C.A.).
46. See Lingenfelder, 15 S.W. at 846.
47. Id.
48. Foakes, 9 App. Cas. at 605-06.
49. See Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 passim (9th Cir. 1902).
50. SAMUEL WILLISTON, III THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1601 (1920).
51. Id. at § 1602.
52. "[S]ome jurisdictions are less ready than others to treat the defence of duress
at law as having been enlarged to this extent by borrowing from equity." Id. at § 1603.
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The expanded conception of duress that was percolating in the
courts in the early years of the twentieth century, however, did not
encompass the modern conception of "economic duress." It was not
until the 1940s that courts generally started to recognize the defense
of economic duress.53 If that newer concept were around in 1902, my
guess is that the appellate court would have used it. In other words,
the lack of a fully developed concept of duress (rather than the labor
context of the case) may have driven the appellate court to use the
pre-existing duty rule to police the contract modification and justify
ruling against the fishermen.
These complications, however, do not negate Professor Snyder's basic insight so much as suggest some possible refinements to it. The
case continues to be relevant to discussions of both contract and labor
law. The specialization of labor law to resolve labor disputes has not
rendered Alaska Packers' obsolete in the labor law context. Similarly,
the growth of economic duress as a tool for policing contract modifications has not rendered the pre-existing duty rule obsolete in contract
law. If the case did not originate the deformation of contract law
caused by the use of the latter to police contract modifications, it has
certainly continued and reinforced that distortion.
IV.

ALASKA

PACKERS' TODAY: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE
MORE THEY STAY THE SAME

Although the Ninth Circuit never held that Alaska Packers' involved duress, scholars and jurists since have gone that far and further, labeling Alaska Packers' "a classic case of duress."5 4 Judge
Richard Posner in particular seems rather fond of the case. In the last
twenty years, Alaska Packers' has been cited thirteen times: twelve of
those citations appeared in cases decided by the Seventh Circuit, and
Judge Posner authored eight of those Seventh Circuit decisions.
53. See, e.g., Cal. Elec. Power Co. v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 344, 359-60 (Ct. Cl.
1945).
54. See Trompler, Inc. v. NLRB, 338 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.).
55. The following Seventh Circuit opinions were authored by Judge Posner: Trompier Inc., 338 F.3d at 748, 751; Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., 313 F.3d 385, 390 (7th Cir. 2002); Prof'l Serv. Network, Inc. v. Am.
Alliance Holding Co., 238 F.3d 897, 900-01 (7th Cir. 2001); Herremans v. Carrera
Designs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1118, 1120, 1122 (7th Cir. 1998); Oxxford Clothes XX, Inc. v.
Expeditors Int'l of Wash., Inc., 127 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Stump Home Specialities Mfg., Inc., 905 F.2d 1117, 1118, 1122 (7th Cir. 1990); Wis.
Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285 (7th Cir. 1986); Selmer Co.
v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 926-27 (7th Cir. 1983). The following Seventh Circuit opinions were not authored by Judge Posner: Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of
N.Y. v. Intercounty Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 537, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2002) (EasterDist. Council of
brook, J.); Contempo Design, Inc. v. Chicago & Northeast I11.
Carpenters, 226 F.3d 535, 549 (7th Cir. 2000) (Ripple, J.); Rissman v. Rissman, 213
F.3d 381, 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.); Indus. Representatives v. CP
Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128, 129-130 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.). Note that three
of these opinions were authored by Judge Posner's law and economics colleague,
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Clearly, something about Alaska Packers' has caught and held Judge
Posner's attention.
Recall that Posner is critical of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Alaska Packers',specifically its use of the pre-existing duty rule to police contract modifications.5 6 Nevertheless, he believes the case was
correctly decided.57 Accordingly, he has recast the case as one of economic duress.58 According to Posner, Alaska Packers' is an example
of "the situation in which one person obtains a temporary monopoly
that it tries to use to obtain a benefit to which it is not entitled."5 9
In Posner's narrative, once the fishermen arrive in Alaska, they realize that they have "an effective albeit temporary monopoly of the
labor supply" and use that monopoly power to obtain additional
wages.6" The fact of the remote location and the fact of the short
salmon fishing season, combined, result in the conclusion that it was
impossible to sail to San Francisco and back with new fishermen during the season.6 1 This conclusion then leads to the assumption that
there is no other way for the cannery to get fish to can, and thus that it
will lose an entire season, if it does not cave in to the workers' demands. 62 In sum, Posner sees the case as an archetypical case of economic duress: one party exploiting the other's temporary market
vulnerability with a bad faith refusal to perform.
Moreover, Posner also shows us that Alaska Packers' has continuing
relevance to labor disputes and gives us an explanation why. Trompler, Inc. v. NLRB, the most recent Posner decision to cite Alaska
Packers', is a case involving a labor dispute, specifically, a work stoppage by nonunion employees.63 In his opinion, Posner notes that the
National Labor Relations Act6 4 now governs the right of workers to
engage in work stoppages. 65 He goes on to say:
Judge Easterbrook. The final case is Burlington Ins. Co. v. Trygg-Hansa Ins. Co. AB,
No. 00-1373, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 10625, at *9 (4th Cir. May 23, 2001) (per curiam)
(not designated for publication).
56. See Wis. Knife Works, 781 F.2d at 1285.
57. See id. at 1286.
58. See Trompler, Inc., 338 F.3d at 751; Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A., 313 F.3d
at 390; Profl Serv. Network, Inc., 238 F.3d at 900-01; Oxxford Clothes XX Inc., 127
F.3d at 579; Stump Home Specialties Mfg., Inc., 905 F.2d at 1121-22; Selmer Co., 704
F.2d at 927.
59. Profl Serv. Network, Inc., 283 F.3d at 900.
60. Id. at 900-01.
61. See id.
62. Oddly enough, while the question of whether the nets were serviceable cannot
be determined from this temporal distance, the historical record compellingly indicates that these assumptions were false: each season the Pyramid Harbor cannery
purchased between 25% and 40% of its fish from the local Native American tribes.
See Threedy, supra note 1, at 212.
63. Trompler, Inc., 338 F.3d at 748.
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
65. Trompler, Inc., 338 F.3d at 748; see 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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The National Labor Relations Act models labor relations as tests of
strength between workers and management. Workers withhold or
threaten to withhold their labor in order to impose costs on management that will induce management to improve the workers'
terms or conditions of employment, and employers if they don't
want to knuckle under to the workers' demands can try to impose
costs on the workers by locking them out, laying them off, and hiring permanent replacements .. . .This [is a] "combat" model of
labor relations ... 66
Posner then discusses how economic duress is a limitation on the
workers' right to strike, but the concept must not be defined too
broadly, as then "no strike would be protected activity, since the entire purpose of a strike is to exert economic pressure on the employer
by withholding labor services that he needs."6 7 He uses his idea of
"the exploitation of temporary monopolies" 68 as marking the line between legitimate economic pressure and illegitimate economic duress.
He distinguishes Trompler from Alaska Packers' on this basis, as he
sees no evidence of a temporary monopoly on the part of the striking
workers in the case before him.69
Thus, we see that Alaska Packers' is alive and well in the context of
labor disputes, even if its relevance has shifted from the pre-existing
duty rule to the doctrine of economic duress. "The combat model of
labor relations" was certainly the operative model in 1900, and Posner
suggests it continues to be the model today.7" In such a model, the
law provides the combatants with the "rules of engagement" and the
doctrine of economic duress is one such rule.
But lest it appear that Alaska Packers' is now relevant only on the
question of economic duress and that the pre-existing duty rule is a
thing of the past, I will close with a discussion of yet another recent
Seventh Circuit opinion, also involving a labor dispute and citing to
Alaska Packers'.
In Contempo Design, Inc. v. Chicago & Northeast Illinois District
71
Council of Carpenters,
the company and the union were subject to a
self-renewing collective bargaining agreement.7 2 Believing that the
agreement had expired, the union threatened to call a strike unless the
company agreed to a new agreement providing for higher wages.7 3
The Seventh Circuit first determined that the original agreement was
66. Trompler, Inc., 338 F.3d at 750 (citation omitted).
67. Id. at 751.
68. Id.
69. And of course, my argument is that if all the relevant facts had been put
before the court in Alaska Packers', there would likewise have been no evidence of a
temporary monopoly by the striking fishermen.
70. Trompler, Inc., 338 F.3d at 750.
71. 226 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2000).
72. Id. at 541.
73. Id.
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in force." Having found the original agreement to be still effective,
agreement was unenforcethe court then determined that the new
75
able-using the pre-existing duty rule!
For a final twist, four judges dissented, arguing that the case should
be decided under the doctrine of economic duress.7 6 They argued that
the majority erred "by disguising what really is a finding of duress in
lack-of-consideration's clothing. '77 Applying the doctrine of economic duress, the dissenting judges did find that "the Union had Contempo over a barrel" as "the Union struck just as Contempo was
negotiating a multiyear, multimillion-dollar contract. ' 78 The dissent,
however, distinguished the present case from Alaska Packers' because
the Union was under a good faith, albeit mistaken, belief that the original agreement had expired and that they were free to negotiate a new
contract.7 9 Conversely, according to the dissenting judges, "[in]
Alaska Packers' there was no doubt that a valid contract was in place
and there was no doubt that the employees had acted in bad faith."8
Ironically, if the trial court in Alaska Packers' had ruled, as it well may
have, that the fishermen had a good faith, albeit mistaken, belief that
the nets were inadequate, the dissent's reasoning would have upheld
the renegotiated contract.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Snyder's provocative theory about the mutually deleterious interaction between labor disputes and contract doctrine is mostly
validated by an examination of the labor dispute at the heart of
Alaska Packers', one of the canonical first year contracts cases, with
one reservation. The pre-existing duty rule, the contract doctrine involved in that case, did not allow the striking workers to renegotiate
the terms of their employment contract. Moreover, the pre-existing
duty rule has been roundly criticized for doing a poor job of policing
contract modifications, whether in the employment context or more
generally. The problem for Professor Snyder's theory is that the rule
predated the case, so the case cannot fairly be said to have caused the
unfortunate rule.
Nevertheless, Alaska Packers' has probably done as much as any
case to keep the doctrine alive, and the memorable facts of the labor
dispute in the case-the shortness of the salmon season and the re74. Id. at 548.
75. Id. at 551-52. Judge Posner voted with the majority and did not even write a
concurring opinion. See id. at 540, 555.
76. See id. at 555 (Evans, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 556 (Evans, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
80. Id. Of course, I argue that, as regards the nets, there is a high likelihood that
the fishermen had a good faith belief that the nets were inadequate, even if in fact
they were mistaken. See Threedy, supra note 1, at 206-07.
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mote Alaskan location-no doubt have contributed to the case's continuing popularity. In sum, one hundred years after Alaska Packers'
was decided, it continues to be relevant to labor disputes, and it continues to muddy the doctrinal waters.
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